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A B S T R A C T
Accepting the call to treat the ‘toolbox’ and not the ‘tools’ as central to doing Foucauldian
analysis (Paltrinieri, 2012), this paper draws on Foucault’s characterisation of his project as
‘a critical history of thought’ (Florence, 1994) where ‘thought is understood as the very
form of action’ (Foucault, 1987a). Therewith the paper seeks to develop an analysis of
corruption and corruption prevention among elites (Neu et al, 2015) in two ways. First it
adopts Foucault’s analysis of ‘illegalism’ in Discipline and Punish (1977: 82ff), wherein
corruption ceases to be a negative—the ‘unlawful’ counterposed to ‘law’ as positive—as law
itself becomes destabilised, framed by different forms of illegalism: ‘illegalisms of
property’ for the poor leading to imprisonment, ‘illegalisms of rights’ for the powerful
which go unchallenged. It suggests that elite corruption now supplements its use of the
latter illegalisms through recourse to expert discourses of ‘hyper-legalism’, increasingly
entailing a ‘skilful accounting’ (Neu et al, 2015). Second, Neu et al propose that corruption’s
prevention may be effected by a modern Foucauldian ‘ethical and disciplined subject’.
However Foucault’s analysis of modern self-formation in The Birth of Biopolitics (2008:
219ff) suggests this may prove problematic. The Human Capitalist subject is there an
‘abilities machine’ and ‘entrepreneur of one’s self’. As ‘abilities machine’ it is ‘disciplined’,
forming itself within the ‘truth games’ of today’s ‘double disciplinarity’, sc. involving self-
engagement with both disciplinary conduct and disciplinary expertise. As ‘self-
entrepreneur’ it may also, formally, be ‘ethical’ (cf. Dilts, 2011), based on Foucault’s
own classiﬁcation of the aspects of that relation (Foucault, 1987b). But substantively its
‘ethicality’ may entail ploys of hyper-legalism and skilful accounting, leading to
corruption’s continuance as well.
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j.cpaway of thinking and which cannot be analysed from the point of view of a history of thought.’ (Foucault, Preface to The
History of Sexuality, 1987a: 335)11. Introduction: on linking ‘corruption prevention’ and ‘subject construction’
As I ﬁrst read, and then re-read, the provocative (in the best sense of thought-provoking) piece by Neu, Everett, and
Rahaman (2015), and then reﬂected on—‘Preventing corruption in government procurement: constructing the disciplined
and ethical subject’—I found myself referring back to the two passages from Foucault above.
First I found the piece so very Foucauldian in its conjoining of such potentially discomﬁting binaries: ‘preventing’
alongside ‘constructing’, but also ‘preventing corruption’, at the level of ‘government’, alongside ‘constructing’ the subject, at
the level of ethicality. Second, I found it, through its choice of binaries, bringing into proximity two signiﬁcant Foucauldian
themes which are often kept apart: on the one side self-construction, as a form of ‘care of the self’, frequently seen as taking
place at the ‘level’ of the individual: and on the other world-construction as a practice of governmentality, frequently seen as
taking place at the ‘level’ of the social, the economic, the political, or some combination of these.
As a result, I found it putting into play two intriguing analytical possibilities which are key aspects of Foucault’s agitating
of our thought. The ﬁrst is the possibility of taking up the kind of destabilising of the conventional ‘levels’ of explanation
which Foucault’s analyses constantly engaged in, as in the second passage above where the level of the ‘individual’ is
dissolved as a basis for analysis of sexuality.
Here he begins analysis from the very different category of ‘experience’ which is not reducible to either an ‘individual’ or a
‘supra-individual’ level of explanation. He has introduced the category right at the start of the ‘Preface’, as he explains that across
his seriesof researches intosexuality indifferenteras,hisplanwastoanalysesexualityas ‘ahistorically speciﬁc formofexperience’
(1987a: 333); he has then explained (in a variation of what he says in the passage cited above), that this has required treating
‘experience’ ‘as the correlation of a domain of knowledge [savoir], a type of normativity, and amode of relation to the self’ (1987a:
333).But thisdestabilises the ‘individual’,which in itsetymology isan ‘un-dividable’, as it isﬁrstly renderedporousbothto formsof
knowledgeand to setsof rulesornorms fromtheoutside,while it is secondlydividedon the inside, as subject engaged inamodeof
‘relation to self’. As a construct, and thereforeas a ‘level’ of analysis, it becomes (literally) incoherent. But so equallydoany formsof
analysis which pass over the problematic status of the individual as an ‘undividable’: as is the case for forms of supra-individual
analysis which leave that problematic status unaddressed insofar as such individuals are simply collectivised, whether
etymologically into a ‘band of allies’ (socii), or into those forming a ‘household’ (oikos), or into those constituting a ‘city’ (polis).
But the piece also potentially puts into play a way of engaging with corruption which does not begin, as if from a positive
conceptual ground for analysis, from the side of ‘the law’, and then seeks to discriminatewhat (just, or justly) falls outside the
law from what (just or justly) falls within it. This form of agitation of our thought is what potentially follows if we begin
analysis from the side of the concept that Foucault puts so intriguingly into play in Discipline and Punish: ‘illegalism’.
‘Illegalism’, as noted in Footnote 1, is not the term familiar to readers of Discipline and Punish, where the term used is
‘illegality’; nevertheless ‘ille´galisme’ is the term Foucault uses throughout the French original, Surveiller et Punir.
It is, I suggest,more of a conceptual term,where the termused in English, ‘illegality’, keeps a focus on illegal ‘acts’. As such,
it sets up a relation to a reciprocal which is not law but ‘le´galisme’. ‘Illegalism’ plays off, works round, but also deﬁnes
‘legalism’. It operates very precisely to construct that threshold and barrier of what falls just (and justly in legalism’s terms,
which are after all the only terms the law in practice can articulate) inside and outside the law. It also plays off and works
round the convenient fact of law in practice, that there are multiple forms of the law, e.g. canon, civil, common, commercial,
constitutional, criminal, and never forgetting that form familiar to those who have read Dickens’ Bleak House, Chancery.
Illegalism thrives on the opportunities for what one might call ‘legal trumping’, using one ‘c-form’ to block or envelop
another. It thrives, in the context of corruption today, in the multiple uses today of commercial, tax, or international trade
law to trump civil or even constitutional law ‘rights’—somethingwhich, at the time of writing, critics have identiﬁed as being
a consequence of the current Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) proposals.
Illegalism therefore has a claim to becoming a ‘lodestar term’ around which to gravitate in seeking to make sense of
corruption’s fashionable and emergent ruses: perhaps because starting from theremay help us not tomake law into a barrier
with illegalities just on its far side. For once illegalism is seen as framing legalism one may see how its principle is to operate
simultaneously on either side of the barrier. On one side it engenders what are named ‘illegalities’, but on the other it
engenders what we might counter-name forms of ‘hyper-legalism’.
The tactics of such hyper-legalism embrace not only the use of the law to evade the law, albeit in slightly differing ways,
but also the cloak of ‘transparency’. Neu et al. (2015: 2) rightly note the presence in developed states of those ‘luminous
arrangements’ which enact ‘effective anti-corruption procurement practices’, particularly through the use of ‘written
inscriptions to construct moments and spaces of visibility, the examination of these inscriptions by auditors, and the
subsequent generation and circulation of inspection traces’. In the presence of such practices and such visibility, one almosttranslation of both these passages is emended, following a practice of emendation of the published translations of Foucault which Stuart Elden has
begun, voicing what I see as a very real concern about how the published English translations do not always follow the surface of Foucault’s French
ents. In the ﬁrst of the passages above, I have substituted for the English term ‘illegality’, the term long familiar from the text of Discipline and Punish,
‘illegalism’, since the termwhich Foucault uses in Surveiller et Punir is ‘ille´galisme’ (Foucault, 1975: 284–285). In the second, I have substituted the
nowledges’ for the published version’s ‘understandings’ since Foucault’s French term is connaissances.
se cite this article in press as: Hoskin, K. ‘‘What about the box?’’ Some thoughts on the possibility of ‘corruption
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subsequent scrutiny of ‘inspection traces’; and many of these will turn out to be well-formed accounting inscriptions.
Theoperationof just suchahyper-legal cloakof transparency iswelldescribed inanearlier piece involvingmanyof the same
authors (Neu, Everett, Rahaman, & Martinez, 2013). This notes the weakness of any ‘functionalist view’ which frames
accounting purely as what onemight call a white-hat activity, and so ‘normatively positions accountants as virtuous actors in
the anti-corruptionﬁght’ (2013: 505). Instead theypropose re-framing the situationasonewhere there is an interplay between
‘speciﬁc types of accounting-based anti-corruption barriers and characteristic games of inﬂuence politics’ (2013: 506). Their
analysis of corruption incidents then indeed shows that encounterswith such accounting-based barriers prove to be integral to
the playing of an inﬂuence politics game, particularlywithin the institutional settings analysed by Johnston (2005) as typical of
developed states—most importantly the ‘inﬂuence market’ and perhaps also the ‘elite cartel’ settings in his typology.
However, seen through a prism where this game is played under the principle of ‘illegalism’, these barriers can appear to
be turning into accounting-based corruption thresholds, through what they describe as a ‘skilful use of accounting and
accounting-implicated strategies’ (506).2 Such thresholds are essential not only because they shroud the nature of corrupt
transactions in the cloak of transparency, but because they make possible a progression across whole series of thresholds—
which become what one protagonist refers to as the ‘normal channels’ (2013: 520) for hiding payments in plain sight, and
which are also a vehicle for deniability and protestations of injured innocence.
Indeed, the paper brings home the signiﬁcance and prudential value of such accounting-based corruption thresholds
when it recounts what happens when a new intermediary, or political bagman, takes over the running of the corrupt
payments scheme. He asks for $100,000 cash, to which the business protagonist involved remarks ‘that’s $200,000 through
normal channels’: but the real problem is that payment cannot now be hidden in plain sight, nor does it have the quality of
deniability that ensues from multiple re-inscription in series of accounts; instead as the paper notes, ‘the conversion of the
repatriations into cash. . .becomes the responsibility of the business participant rather than the political bagman’ (2013:
520), with the outcome that the business protagonist ‘pleaded guilty to ﬁve counts of fraud, totaling just under $2million’,
and received a 30 month jail sentence (2013: Appendix, 522).
Summing up to this point: I see this as a paper raising a range of provocative and discomﬁting insights which it brings into
proximity along two linked lines of analysis. The ﬁrst line raises the question of howwe should analyse the interplays between
accountingandacorruptionwhichappears todayfullyembedded inwhatonemight call ‘governmental/managerial’ complexes
situated within ‘advanced’ or ‘developed’ states which conduct their business under what the paper calls ‘the practices and
politics of visibility within government’ (2014: 2). Here I see Foucault’s observations on illegalism in Discipline and Punish as
potentiallyopeningupa formofanalyticswhichmaypushthisnewlyopendoormoreopenstill, andparticularly if accounting is
seen as operating as a vehicle of ‘hyper-legalism’ and thus constructing not just barriers against but also thresholds for
corruption. I shall therefore, in the section after next, return to consider more fully the range of what he has to say across that
book, and particularly in Part Two ‘Punishment’, on illegalism and its relations to both law and to order.
However it is the second line of analysis—which concerns how differing forms of the subject are constituted in different
historical eras—that I want to turn to ﬁrst: for the fact that there may be a conjunction to be made between the discomﬁting
binaries, ‘preventing corruption’ at the level of ‘government’ and ‘constructing the subject’, at the level of ethicality, is particularly
provocative, but also, I think, necessary. I therefore propose to dwell a little further on how this implicates us in beginning from
‘experience’,understood, asFoucaultputs it in that second introductorypassage I chose, as ‘awayof thinking’, andsomething to ‘be
analysed fromthepoint of viewof ahistory of thought’. This is adirection inwhichNeuet al have already set off, remarking (2014:
4) how ‘just prior to his death, Foucault suggested that his entire opus of work was concerned with the ways that human beings
were constructed as subjects at differentmoments in time and in different settings’, citing a piece on Foucault by Florence (1994),
which is now recognised as mainly by Foucault with the ﬁrst paragraphs by his then-research assistant, Franc¸ois Ewald.
It is this piece that I now turn to, although I shall consider it along with that Preface to the History of Sexuality project we
met above, and also the Introduction to Volume II in that project, The Uses of Pleasures, since all three are written in the same
general time period, and each takes up slightly different reﬂections on Foucault’s oeuvre. Together, they relay an insistent and
consistent message concerning the ‘subject’ and how to approach its analysis: ﬁrst, as already hinted at, that, as a
methodological choice, it should not be treated as ‘constitutive’ (Florence, 1994: 317): and second that it should be
approached from the side of ‘thought’, and of ‘thought’ understood as historically given and situated.3 So I turn here to these
pieces: and in the process will perhaps bring into relief the question I posed in my own title: ‘What about the box?’
2. ‘What about the box?’
Concerning Foucault’s project, Florence/Foucault says simply: ‘his undertaking could be called A Critical History of
Thought’ (1994: 314) before deﬁning that more closely ﬁrst by specifying ‘thought’ (pense´e) as ‘the act which poses, in their2 They later refer (2013: 513–514) to the construction of such inscriptions as invoices leading to accounting entries for ‘design and consulting services’,
and to a case (2013: 517)where an invoice was re-written to appear ‘as a normal business experience’ and, once re-written, could be used ‘for tax purposes’.
3 There are two other methodological choices speciﬁed by Foucault/Florence: the ﬁrst is also negative, to maintain ‘a systematic scepticism with respect
to all anthropological universals’; the third is positive, the procedure of ‘appealing to ‘‘practices’’ as a domain of analysis, of approaching one’s study from the
side of what ‘‘one did’’ (ce qu’ ‘‘on faisait’’)’ (Florence, 1994: 318). For an intriguing study which has drawn on Foucault’s analysis of the relations between
thinking and acting to analyse ‘self-formation through the activity of organic farming in a self-managing community’, see Skinner (2013).
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which certain relations between subject and object are formed ormodiﬁed to the extent that these relations are constitutive
of a possible knowledge (savoir)’. The double author then furthermodiﬁes that by specifying that what has to be determined
is the reciprocal ‘mode of subjectivation’ of the subject and ‘mode of objectivation’ of the object. Once these historically
speciﬁcmodes are determined, then this critical historymay be able to consider how, through the ‘mutual development and
reciprocal bond’ of subject and object, ‘there are born what one could call the ‘‘games of truth’’’ (1994: 315).
This description of Foucault’s project raises three implications for my observations here. First implication: it commits me
systematically to seeking towork from ‘the bottomup’: i.e. from thought as act, articulating itself through statements and actions.
Second implication: it commits me, as integral feature of this ‘bottom-up’ approach, to keeping constantly in mind how
‘experience’ as Foucault describes it has always a triple constitution: ﬁrst out of the historically speciﬁc knowledges or
knowledge one is born into (and in his relational form of analysis, he is referring both to the surface knowledges or
‘connaissances’ of a given era, and to the particular mode of savoirwithin which those historically speciﬁc connaissance forms
get constituted): second out of the historically speciﬁc forms of regular or rule-based practices one undergoes; and then only
third, out of the consequent type of ‘relation to self’ one may have, a relation which is simultaneously self-dividing and self-
constructing, as the relation as subject one has to oneself as object.
Third implication: working from the bottom up has to apply equally when seeking to consider categories beyond the
subject and object relation, such as ‘the state’ or ‘the economy’, but also such metaphysical categories as the ‘illegalism’ that
we have put in play here on the basis of his observations in Discipline and Punish, along with its implied corollary term,
‘legalism’, and their dispersion today into acts both of illegality and of hyper-legality. In this context, the bottom-up
approach will apply also to a second corollary term which Foucault brings into play, ‘order’: ‘order’ as that which goes of
course with ‘law’ as its partner in (or against) crime, but an order which Foucault also opposes to law, as what short-circuits
the eighteenth-century juridical discourse on the relation between crime and appropriate forms of punishment leading
instead to the utterly unheralded new solution of ‘prison’. So ‘order’ perhaps has its own dispersion of terms or outcomes, on
the side of or alongside illegality, ‘disorder’, and on the side of or alongside hyper-legality. ‘hyper-order’, as encountered in
today’s forms of governmentality in the obsessive norms and targets of management via accounting.
This is again simply to follow in Foucault’s wake, particularly concerning governmentality. For as he puts it at the end of
the lecture series in which he introduces the term ‘governmentality’—Security, Territory, Population (Foucault, 2007)—the
appropriate method that he suggests for its study is to start ‘from the relatively local and microscopic analysis of those
typical forms of power of the pastorate’ and then pass to consider the state, not as ‘a transcendent reality’ but ‘on the basis of
men’s actual practice, on the basis of what they do and how they think’. Thus he concludes thatwe should start ‘analyzing the
state as a way of doing things, [the state as a way of thinking]’ (2007: 358).4
So this suggests to me that both the supposedly ‘socio-political-economic-level’ issue of ‘corruption prevention’ and the
supposedly individual-leveloneof ‘thedisciplinedandethical subject’ shouldbeconsideredaswaysofdoingthingsandwaysof
thinking. But that then leads to a necessarily historical posing of a further question: assuming that ‘corruption prevention’ and
the construction of a subject combining both ‘discipline’ and ‘ethicality’ are in principle possible, then in what historically
speciﬁc forms are they possible today? What does it take to actualise them? Or to put that question in another resonant
Foucauldian variant, with a particular import where corruption and ethicality are in play: what does it ‘cost’?5
The more I have circled around these questions the more my answers have begun to situate themselves at a level of
‘framing’ each of the two titular terms, and then seeking to think their possible relations to each other on that basis. And in
that framing, I have become particularly aware that accountingmay have some signiﬁcant analytical purchase in articulating
what those interrelations may be. And these are not necessarily roles which one attempts to specify through ‘reading into’
Foucault some form or practice of accounting which may be claimed to ‘haunt’ his work, but roles where accounting is a
technology or tool already put into play by Foucault as an integral aspect of his analytics: whence (if accounting can indeed
legitimately be read as such a tool for him) I am led to my own main title: ‘What about the box?’
Here credit where credit is due: I had been concerned for some time about the easewhereby Foucault’s terms or ideas can
be expropriated from their place within his own way of thinking: as for instance with the widespread understanding of his
work as progressing from ‘archaeology’ to the undertaking of ‘pure’ genealogical analysis, when this is not a claim that he
ever makes himself.6 However the thought that this might be an appropriate title would not have come to me without my4 As with Footnote 1, this is not the place for a long disquisition on the perils of translation errors or omissions. However it does need noting that here the
usually excellent Graham Burchell suffers what is technically known as a case of ‘haplography’ at the point where I have inserted the square brackets in the
main text. In the French Foucault proposes thatwemight analyse ‘L’E´tat commemanie`re de faire, L’E´tat commemanie`re de penser’ (Foucault, 2004: 366). In the
English the phrase form ‘L’E´tat comme manie`re de. . .’ is rendered only once.
5 I owe the insight into how frequently Foucault inserts a question of ‘cost’ into his statements to Jeffrey Nealon’s Foucault Beyond Foucault (2008: 17–23)
which has a whole section on ‘Foucauldian Economics: what does it cost?
6 One should bear in mind that Arnold Davidson was warning back in 1986, noting late passages where Foucault continues to describe his work as
combining both approaches: ‘It would be a mistake to think that Foucault ever abandoned his archaeological method’ (1986: 227). I ﬁnd it accordingly
signiﬁcant that in the third of his late reﬂections on hiswork, the Introduction to The Use of Pleasures, Foucault describes his analysis of ‘theman of desires’ as
locating itself ‘at the crossing point of an archaeology of the problematisations of, and a genealogy of the practices of, the self’ (1986: 13). In which case the
widespread belief in his move from archaeology falls foul of the paradox of ‘commentary’ described in ‘The Order of Discourse’ (Foucault, 1972: 221): that
commentary ‘must—and the paradox is ever-changing but inescapable—say for the ﬁrst time what has always been said and repeat tirelessly what was,
nevertheless, never said’.
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Foucault’s oeuvre (e.g. Elden, 2013;Webb, 2013) that do not seek to undertake the two age-old functions of commentary but
instead stay at the surface of what Foucault says, and attempt to think what is there ‘as it is written’: in this instance, what
Paltrinieri challenges is the also-widespread notion that what Foucault offers is ‘tools’ from a ‘tool box’.
The challenge comes in the second part of a critique of the twomajor types of work on or using Foucault over the decades
since his death (2012: 7–10). First there are the ‘commentators’ (2012: 7–8), where the danger identiﬁed is precisely that
captured by Foucault: that the tireless repetition of the unsaid renders it into what must have been said, while good
commentary’s knack of memorable ﬁrst-time (re)statements of things already said works to render things said in a
secondary way primary. So what is most palatable to hear and/or easiest to work with becomes what is internalised and
appropriated as ‘holy writ’.
Then there are the ‘users’ (‘usagers’), among whom Paltrinieri numbers those who have picked up what he calls ‘the
unfortunate Foucauldian-Deleuzian metaphor of the ‘‘tool box’’’ (2012: 8, his emphasis): unfortunate insofar as it leads to
transposing (again his emphasis) Foucauldian tools into alien epistemological frames, from the social-scientiﬁc/sociological/
political to the literary to that of science history. Not all users do this, he emphasizes—and certainly the Neu et al. paper, for
me, does not. But the point he then makes (2012: 10) is that we should strive ‘not to forget the speciﬁc form of the
Foucauldian work’, and in particular:
‘Put differently, the fact of appropriating the tools in the box should not lead to under-valuing the box, and evenmore the
work of continual reconstruction and transformation of that box’ (2012: 10).
Hence: ‘What about the box?’ What ‘framing’ of the two titular constructs of this paper, with what roles for accounting
(and to a lesser extent management), might emerge by beginning from the two passages of Foucault that preface these
comments of mine? What I can say here can only be preliminary, and I remain wholly uncertain as to whether this may
presage a work of (in Paltrinieri’s terms) reconstruction or transformation: or no more than a re-illumination of a frame
already there.
However, that said, I want to offer some schematic observations in my next section on how ‘corruption prevention’ may
be framed beginning from Foucault’s suggestions concerning the signiﬁcance of ‘illegality’ or as I nowwould say ‘illegalism’,
as a kind of covering term for approaching the analysis of issues of ‘law’, but also, as I have just indicated, ‘order’. Then I shall
seek, again schematically, to suggest how ‘experience’ may need to be seen as intervening in the construction of the
‘disciplined and ethical subject’ and how that suggests, at the least, that any subject thatmay emergewould prove to bemore
‘disciplinary’ than ‘disciplined’ if it is to have any kind of interrelation with ‘the ethical’. For the ‘disciplinary’ subject has a
necessary relation to our historically speciﬁc ‘connaissances’, sc. ‘the disciplines’, alongside a necessary relation to
disciplinary modes of rule and regularity constituting the dominant modern mode of the ‘conduct of conduct’.
3. Illegalism as framing (and undermining?) ‘corruption prevention’
So howmight we understand the interplay between illegalism or illegalisms and the law, in seeking to get a purchase on
the possibilities of corruption prevention? The Foucault passage I cited on this comes quite late in Discipline and Punish, in
Part Four, Section 2, entitled ‘Illegalities and Delinquency’. But it is the follow-up to an earlier and extended discussion of
illegalism and illegalisms, in Part Two, Section One, ‘Generalized Punishment’ (82–89). And in that opening discussion, the
status of ‘law’ as ‘ground’ or ‘launch point’ for discussions of corruption or any other form of criminality is already, I think,
destabilised. For by starting in this instance from a population of ‘illegalisms’, Foucault can suggest, based on his historical
observations, that illegalism is endemic, both in speciﬁable pasts as well as our speciﬁc present.
He begins by observing that in mediaeval Europe and perhaps up to the eighteenth century there appears to have been a
settled ‘accommodation’ or ‘modus vivendi’ where ‘each of the different social strata had its margin of tolerated illegalism’
and where there was toleration, generally speaking, for ‘non-application of the rule’ or ‘non-observance of the innumerable
edicts or ordinances’ (1977: 82). For each stratum ‘this illegalism. . .had in a sense its own coherence and economy’ (82);
furthermore ‘the different illegalisms proper to each group. . .maintained relations with each other that involved not only
rivalry, competition and conﬂicts of interests but also mutual help and complicity’ (83–84). All of this he characterises as a
dispersed play of an ‘illegalism of rights’ (85).
But what then emerges is the rise of a bourgeoisie who ‘found it difﬁcult to accept illegalismwhen it was a question of its
own property rights’ (85, emphasis added). In consequence, ‘the economy of illegalisms was restructured with the
development of capitalist society. The illegalism of property was separated from the illegalism of rights’ (87). And while the
poor became the principal targets of laws designed to punish attacks on property, ‘the bourgeoisie reserved to itself the
fruitful domain of the illegalism of rights’. That domain Foucault then speciﬁes as that of ‘fraud, tax evasion, irregular
commercial operations’ and also as one which had its own ‘special legal institutions applied with transactions,
accommodation, reduced ﬁnes, etc’ (87).
To which, having read the article here, one might respond, looking forward to today: ‘plus c¸a change. . ..’
However, at the same time, there is one signiﬁcant subsequent bottom-uphistorical change to factor in, I would suggest, if
we are to transpose the exercise of the illegalism of rights to today—and to a world of developed states where the major
emergent forms of playing corruption games become, using Johnston’s typology, the ‘elite cartel’ and ‘inﬂuence market’
forms. This is the transformation in business enterprises ensuing from the invention of managerialism, which is still best
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management ‘line’, and the introduction of a constant process of tracking and shaping activity, plus its costs and revenues,
through a process of constant recording and circulation from bottom to top and back of accounting and statistical
information. Perhaps most importantly this mode of accounting (as the ﬁrst ‘management’ accounting) integrates the
recording and analysis of human performance into a traditional accounting for the consumption and use of physical and
monetary resources. This initially is what makes possible the growth of businesses that dominate their sectors, forming the
ﬁrst cartels of large oligopolistic ﬁrms. Such ﬁrms are now able to undertake those ‘conspiracies against the public’ noted by
Adam Smith, on a scale and with a scope that Smith could never have dreamed of. They can establish new kinds of mutually
advantageous interplaywith governments, whichwhen they take the form ofmutually advantageous corruption games, will
initially be played under the ‘elite cartel’ format. But with the increasingly global spread of managerially-run ﬁrms, all of
which have to operate the hyper-order of a management via accounting regime, tracking human as well as material and
monetary performance, then the possibility of wider ‘inﬂuence markets’ made up of accounting-permeated entities takes
serious hold. We enter a world replete with entities where managers manage other managers, and where nearly all major
economic sectors operate oligopolistically, in markets predicated, as Chandler puts it, on ‘imperfect competition and
misallocation of resources’ (1977: 4).
At this earlier eighteenth century point that Foucault discusses this form of imperfection and misallocation is not yet in
play. Instead, it remains the case that most businesses, even large businesses, are relatively small with relatively low
capitalisation, except in the case of state-sponsored entities such as the Dutch and British East India Companies. Even in the
ﬁeld of ﬁnance which is already highly lucrative (when it is not a ﬁeld of disaster), even large ﬁrms such as Barings and the
Rothschilds are still relatively small, and they depend on principal-agent relations where the agent at a distance has
considerable discretion over how business is conducted, whether that ends up in corrupt conduct or not.7
But with the bottom-up invention of managing via administrative coordination, combining the line-and-staff structure
with constant accounting and statistical information as the means of such coordination, then a new way of thinking and
acting can take hold, enabling both the building of huge managerially run corporate enterprises, which can have a new
relation to ‘the state’, not least as the latter’s ways of thinking and acting also become increasingly managerialist and
accounting-saturated. At that point the domain of the illegalism of rights can become fruitful like never before. Across all
sectors frommanufacturing to services to ﬁnance, entities larger thanmany states, andwith greater resources than theirs (in
terms of ﬁnancial as well as material assets), can begin to renegotiate the terms of trade with such states, employing
coordinative and connective strategies in a dazzling array. Once one has co-opted state servants in host states, then it is a
small step to doing so in home ones as well. Even better why not own your own state, as in effect Du Pont was to do in
Delaware. Themore the corporate enterprise becomes indistinguishable from the state, themore possible that the statemay
re-write its corporate tax code (particularly of course in a bottom-up constitutional system where corporation tax is
primarily a state rather than a federal matter).
But such an analysis is perhaps too misleadingly straightforward, in the light of what Foucault has to say in Discipline and
Punish about illegalism’s implication not only with ‘law’ but with its uneasy partner, ‘order’. There is a twist in his story,
which concerns the fact that it was the prison which would triumph as means of punishment and correction, or which
concerns rather the ‘problem’, as he puts it (1977: 131), that this triumph of the prison represents.
The term ‘problem’ is introduced in the ﬁnal paragraph of Part Two of the book, ‘The Gentle Way in Punishment’. Up till
then this Part consists mainly of a classic ‘archaeological’ analysis of the range of things said by those 18th-century jurists
and penal reformers who look to develop a form of justice beyond the extreme punishment on the body of sovereign power;
and what they say, Foucault concludes, is almost always some variation on a legalistic theme which seeks to promote the
improvement of the criminal or a recognition of the importance of righting a wrong done. Prison simply falls outside the
discursive range of legalistic things said.8
[Incidentally, if for other readers, as was the case for me until recently, this was a discourse of whose presence, let alone
signiﬁcance, in the book you were not really aware, then Schwan and Shapiro’s refreshing How to Read Foucault’s Discipline7 Oneworkwhich brings home the differences frommodernmanagement is Jacob Soll’s The InformationMaster (2009) on the staggering sophistication of
Colbert’s mode of government by ‘inquiry’ (enqueˆte). Colbert deployed a cadre of ofﬁcials and informants to do his will (always in the best interests of Louis
XIV, as Colbert understood them) across France and to report back to him continuously submitting detailed reports, including minutiae of cost and
accounting information, and forwarding original documents wherever possible. The scope and scale of Colbert’s information gathering is phenomenal, yet
he has no line and staff structure either within the world of Louis’s court or dispersed across the vast expanses he controls. Chandlerian ‘administrative
coordination’ is simply an absence. And as Soll points out, Colbert’s magniﬁcent administrative apparatus dies with him, precisely because there is no such
structure populated by cadres of accountants and record-keepers.
8 So they offer proposals such as deprivation of civil rights or the use of ﬁnes, in a sort of ‘reasonable aesthetic of punishment’ (106). These should help
‘reduce the desire thatmakes the crime attractive’, and enable the criminal to see the error of her or hisways. In otherwords: ‘punishmentsmust be a school
rather than a festival’ (111). Foucault also notes that prison perhaps had negative connotations for such reformers since, as amajor vehicle of royal justice, it
‘was, in practice, directly bound up with arbitrary royal decision and the excesses of the sovereign power’ (1977: 119). One possible reason now widely
recognised (e.g. Given, 1997) is that the use of prison as ‘reformatory’ was ﬁrst practised by the Catholic Inquisition in the thirteenth century. Here prison
‘reformed’ since it wasmainly either for suspects who had not yet confessed or those who had confessed and repented. Given, 1997: argues that the system
therefore had threefold aspects: ‘therapeutic, reintegrating potential heretics. . ., a system of social control, putting people into a. . .stigmatised social
outgroup. . ., (and) a semiotic system. . . (teaching) salutary lessons’ (1977: 67).
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Discipline and Punish has received as little care in its reading as the second part’ (2011: 65).]
In any event, the question Foucault then poses, as Part Two closes, is why prison of all things triumphs over the ‘Gentle
Way’. His one-word answer is given in the heading to Part Three: ‘Discipline’. The more extensive historical answer, pitched
at the level of deﬁning and differentiating disciplinary practices, extends across that whole part. First he sets out the
technologies and strategies for producing ‘docile bodies’ (135–169).9 Then he extends his analysis to consider ‘the means of
correct training’ (170–194) – hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and the examination – at which point
emerges a recognition of a point that Deleuze makes, that there is always a ‘diagram’ within which technologies operate,
articulated most memorably in the ﬁnal chapter of Part Three, ‘Panopticism’ (195–228).10
So why prison? The answer that Part Three gives is indeed ‘genealogical’: a systematically new set of practices were
developed, with a particular importance, in my view, for that doubly disciplinary technology in which (1977: 185) ‘the
superimposition of the power relations and knowledge relations assumes. . .all its visible brilliance’: the examination. It is
my own view that this is necessarily ‘doubly disciplinary’ since it embodies relations that are disciplinary in both knowledge
and power respects.11 Regardless of that, Foucault’s point is that this set of practices disrupts and silences the old legalistic
discourse of punishment and correction as identiﬁed and discussed in his archaeological analysis in Part Two. A new and
systematically different discourse becomes articulated inwhich the voices of jurists and reformers are joined, if not drowned
out, by a whole range of new voices; many of them indeed belong to those trained to examine objects and subjects in
systematically new ways, such as those of the human sciences.
It is this new range of voices which, alongside the new punishments for those guilty of ‘illegalisms of property’,
construct that new object, ‘delinquency’. But that object is not a product of ‘law’, so much as ‘order’. And ‘order’,
speciﬁcally the ‘order of discipline’, as articulated in the new panoptic diagram of power, can issue in the ‘complete and
austere institutions’ where the practices of disciplinary correction extend across the whole of institutional space and
time.
In Part Four, ‘Prison’, he discusses ﬁrst those ‘complete and austere institutions’, and then returns to the issue of
‘illegalities and delinquency’ as in my opening quotation. But it is only when he turns ﬁnally to consider what has ensued
as the dissemination, as a generalised principle, of ‘the carceral’, that he closes the analysis begun in Part Two. As he does
so he gives us, it seems to me, the second reason why, for modernity, the ‘law’ constitutes such an impossible ground for
framing illegalisms. It is because the triumph of ‘discipline’ has nothing to do with the law but everything to do with
‘order’.
So he concludes (1977: 301) that ‘the carceral system’ succeeds by ‘its extension well beyond legal punishment’
something that it manages ‘by playing the two registers in which it is deployed – the legal register of justice and the extra-
legal register of discipline’. These are distinct powers, named as ‘the legal power to punish’ and ‘the technical power to
discipline’ (1977: 303), which have been brought together in a newway in this distinctive regime for the exercise of power. It
is the carceral which ‘(i)n thus homogenizing them, effacing what may be violent in one and arbitrary in the other,
. . .circulating the same calculated, mechanical and discreet methods from one to the other, makes it possible to carry out the
great ‘‘economy’’ of power whose formula the eighteenth century had sought, when the problem of the accumulation and
useful administration of men ﬁrst emerged’ (1977: 303).
4. Possible ways forward: or towards different questions: preventing corruption through the construction of the
‘disciplinary and ethical’ subject?
So, ﬁrstly, what is possible as a path to ‘preventing corruption’, taking the box or frame as ‘the play of illegalisms’? In a
sense all of the above has been a negative exercise in that it has sought to signal ways in which corruption is not to be
prevented, insofar as one believes that Foucault’s analysis of the interplay of power relations and knowledge relations has
purchase.9 These include the ‘art of distributions’ (141–149), the ‘control of activity’ (149–156), and the fascinatingly named ‘organization of geneses’ (156–162)
where his analysis considers how individuals become ‘developmental’ subjects as they are inserted into practices that engender in themmultiple ‘geneses’
in just the way that societies discover multiple modes of ‘progress’ (see especially 160): and ﬁnally there is the ‘composition of forces’ which sets up a form
of ‘diagram’ operating across the space and time that the bodies occupy, so that they can so far as possible be guaranteed to become docile, since it renders
them constantly teachable (and of course the adjective ‘docilis’ in Latin initially means ‘teachable’).
10 The signiﬁcance of the ‘diagram’ as the ‘set-up’ or perhaps dispositif for the arranging of thinking and acting in a given era is a point concerning Foucault’s
form of analysis which is made memorably by Deleuze in his book Foucault (1988: 30–35, 70ff). Different eras, different cultures, will have different
diagrams, Deleuze suggests, but the diagram is as essential to the shaping of our thinking and acting in any given era as are the practices which Foucault
often claims are his ‘domain of analysis’. Indeed Foucault invokes it even before the section on Panopticism,when he ﬁrst begins to discuss ‘correct training’,
as he observes of themilitary camp (as established by the 17th century) that it is ‘a diagram of a power that acts bymeans of a general visibility’ (1977: 171).
11 The speciﬁc formof this new examining is important: oral examination has a long tradition in thewest, and is formalised as themeans to taking a step (a
Latin gradus) up and graduating in themediaeval universities, so long as you demonstrate competence in ‘inquisitio’ as the critical reading of texts, in a ‘truth
game’ committed to erasing their contradictions and so establish the non-contradictable truth.Written examining is much older in China. Only in late 18th
century Europe, in various patterns in English, French and German university settings, dowritten examinations allotting numerical grades ormarks become
established, in ﬁelds which arguably pursue truth for the ﬁrst time via these practices, and so constituting the ﬁrst modern ‘knowledge disciplines’ (Hoskin,
1993).
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to be a non-starter. The illegalism of rights exercised by those descendants of the old bourgeoisie who now populate
large corporate entities, big government, and the professional service ﬁrms operating across the accounting, ﬁnancial
and legal arenas appears as inoculated and impervious to law’s attacks now as then. On the contrary, we increasingly
witness how such recourse, thoughtfully strategised, can operate in a directly contrary direction: just select the
appropriate speciﬁc form of law (usually of the contract or commercial type) and you can incarnate an illegalism of rights
which, with the appropriate admixture of disciplinary experts and expertise, can decisively trump old sovereign
state law.
So what, second, if we start instead from somemix of ‘law and order’? The historical precedents of the transformations of
the past two centuries are again not good. Law has tended to call on order as its partner to promote a purportedly general
‘anti-illegalism’ only in two areas. The ﬁrst is the area of the modern ‘illegalisms of property’, where the ‘law ‘n order’
outcome is generally ‘more policing’ and ‘more law’, as has increasingly become endemic in the so-called advanced
democracies and republics.
The second is indeed in the area of ‘illegalisms of rights’, but restrictedly deﬁned as concerning the exercise of old-
style sovereign state or perhaps now constitutional law, i.e. guarding the rights of the state: and this is typically only in
situations where the viability or survival of the state is ‘under threat’, as designated by those who currently govern:
which might explain why the discourse of ‘law and order’ has remained mute throughout the fallout from the Great
Financial Crisis.
Danger to the state is deemed to arise instead only where a direct challenge is mounted to the sovereign power and
its right to rule: should that happen, then ‘law and order’ engages in the same response as law: more policing once
again (but usually including more secret policing too) plus, depending on the nature of the danger to the state, some
level of military intervention or presence (temporary in liberal states, more permanent elsewhere): and, once again,
‘more law’. So the negative conclusion that follows is that corruption prevention should not, at least in current
circumstances, look either to ‘law’ or to ‘law and order’ for any form of deliverance, whether in government procurement
or beyond.
Which leaves the other ‘framing’ possibility the paper raises: whether corruption prevention may perhaps be thinkable
via amore ‘bottomup’ formof analysis, taking an initial focus on the interplay of subject and object relations and the possible
construction of the ‘disciplined and ethical’, or perhaps as I suggested earlier ‘disciplinary and ethical’ subject. In either case,
the challenge, I suggest, at the level of the ‘box’, is to specify what constitutes the relevant ‘experience’ for such a historically
speciﬁc form of subject to become possible at all.
Here my reading of Foucault is as follows: both at the historically speciﬁc level of our connaissances (or even our mode
of savoir), and at the historically speciﬁc form of our rules and regularities, ‘disciplinarity’ has become our ‘experience’.
This may have been an interplay ﬁrst discovered and ‘experienced’ by a few in the late 18th century (see above,
Footnote 11), but it is now dispersed globally. At the same time, we increasingly inhabit diagrams embodying versions
of panopticism—as Foucault might have put it, from schools to prisons to hospitals and now perhaps most fatefully
to managerial places of work. [In this regard Richard Macve and I have suggested that the most effective of
panopticism’s forms is a ‘grammatocentric panopticism’ which overcomes the weakness of 3-D space panopticism
where objects (and subjects) always have a side facing away and so spaces of invisibility. Instead under this version of
the modern diagram, thinking and acting are subject to a constant naming and counting, which modern examining and
modern accounting both constantly apply to the human subject at both ‘individual’ and ‘whole population’ levels,
although as a pan-opticism with multiple viewers, it can be turned against the panopticon: witness Chelsea Manning and
Edward Snowden.]
Insofar as this does plausibly characterise the framing and the practices of our thinking and acting, then there is, I feel,
clear sanction for imagining a ‘rapport a` soi’ resulting in a ‘consciousness of oneself and others’ which can be both
‘disciplinary and ethical’. Indeed such subjects, I suspect, may already be increasingly widely dispersed. Across states,
multinational ﬁrms, governments and professions, human subjects, now of both genders, are experiencing, and experienced
in, learning under pedagogic and work regimes where we must write, be constantly examined, and then be numerically
evaluated in ever more dizzying but nevertheless expanding ways.
In this respect I believe that the paper does open a path through which it may be possible to think the issue of corruption
prevention in a positive way. However there is then the issue of how tomove from the plane of ‘experience’ and ‘the subject’
to the plane where effective prevention may become generally operative; and even if after Callon and Latour’s acrobatics in
‘Unscrewing the Big Leviathan’ (1981) we know that it is possible to think this as a movement of ‘scaling up’ and ‘scaling
down’, and even if, in consequence,wemay avoid retranslating the state, the corporation and the bought-and-paid-for think-
tank into so many ‘cold monsters’, this remains an issue for thought.12
I will close with just one suggestion, which is to dwell a little longer at the plane of ‘experience’ and consider what other
form or forms of ‘the subject’ might be already operative and claiming to be ‘disciplinary and ethical’. I suggest this since,12 There is an observation by AE Housman, in his capacity as vituperative scholar rather than pastoral poet, concerning an academic rival whose work he
scorned (albeit an observation that I believe he did not ultimately publish). Concerning one particularly egregious (in his estimation) error, he wrote to the
effect that two minutes’ thought would have shown him his error: ‘but thought is hard work. . .and two minutes is a long time’.
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analyses so memorably in his 1978–1979 lectures at the Colle`ge de France, The Birth of Biopolitics: namely that new form of
the ‘homo oeconomicus’ articulated as the subject of Chicago School Human Capital theory.13
Just as much as the ‘disciplinary and ethical subject’, this ‘homo oeconomicus’ is ‘doubly disciplinary’, given its
characterisation as an ‘abilities-machine’ whose human capital is ‘made up of innate elements and other, acquired elements’
(Foucault, 2008: 227). First the innate includes both the hereditary endowments from one’s parents and the biologically
innate endowments of the species ‘sapiens sapiens’. Here disciplinary expertise may intervene even before conception to
constitute the future abilities machine appropriately; as Foucault notes at some length (227–229), such interventions
already in the late 1970s included ways of checking for and if necessary improving genetic make-up, decisions (implicit or
explicit) over assortative breeding ormating choices, ideallywith some other ‘who has signiﬁcant human capital themselves’
(228). Thirty-ﬁve years on, it is fair to say that both types of intervention have become,where required, ‘no-brainer’ decisions
for already-successful human capitalists seeking to optimise the return on their abilities-machine investments within
‘developed states’.
Then there are the ‘acquired elements’, where the disciplinarity only intensiﬁes, since what their acquisition entails is
‘making what are called educational investments’ (229). And these refer not just the investments to be made in the highest
available quality formal educational institutions and so in the disciplinary knowledges they embody and provide (from
nursery to graduate school); there are also all the investments required beyond formal education, equally embodying the
ﬁndings of disciplinary expertise. Foucault cites (229–230) parental (i.e.mainlymaternal) time spentwith children: the level
of ‘cultural stimuli’ provided by high-human-capital (i.e. ‘more educated’) parents: the level and types of specialist medical
care invested in (and where now gynaecological, paediatric, and dental investments are all de rigueur); and ﬁnally there is
‘mobility’, deﬁned as the ‘ability to move around’ including migration (though of course with the status of ‘welcomed and
legal immigrant’).
The product of all this investment therefore very much undergoes, and/or forms her or his self within, a doubly
disciplinary frame. Indeed an adequate return on the investment (which is now the ‘income stream’ from one’s ‘capital’, not a
‘wage’ provided as remuneration for ‘one’s work’) is possible only if three conditions are fulﬁlled. Firstly the fruits of
disciplinary expertise must be made to ﬂourish in the body from embryo or before to adulthood; second the knowledge
resources of disciplinary expertise must be successfully transformed into the contents of a ‘well-stocked’ mind; and ﬁnally
an appropriately remunerated form of disciplinary expertise must be successfully obtained as passe-partout to the mobile,
legally and institutionally migratory life.
Thus this new homo oeconomicus is not (2008: 226) the old ‘partner in exchange’: she or he is ‘an entrepreneur, an
entrepreneur of her/himself’ (the French is the gender-neutral lui-meˆme). And incidentally as Foucault then observes (2008:
231), human capital theory can then explain why the old predictions concerning ‘the tendency of the rate of proﬁt to fall
actually turned out to be continuously corrected’. The aggregation of self-entrepreneurs (which is almost the opposite of the
aggregation of small-business entrepreneurs, 90% plus of whom are destined to fail) generates the ‘innovation’ that
Schumpeter ﬁrst identiﬁed as the counter-force to that tendency—arguably because they are in aggregate not just, in
Foucault’s terminology, ‘manageable’ and ‘eminently governable’ (see above Footnote 13), but self-managing and governing
as environments change. So both social and economic policy become increasingly framed in terms of optimal human capital
investment—with the ‘hard choices’ that necessarily follow in all times of economic downturn.
Now the analysis may be brilliant: but there are two things that I would add about it. First that it ought to give us pause—
and thismay particularly apply to uswho are now somuch further into a ‘neoliberal ascendancy’—ifwe have any tendency to
see this neoliberal form of the subject as ‘other’ or ‘different’: or worse, as in some respects as fatally ethically ﬂawed or even
anti-ethical. For it is, at the level of ‘experience’ as deﬁned by Foucault, just one alternative version of who we become as
subjects, and how we become such via ‘experience’.
Second, the analysis is, in one particular respect, genuinely positive and even laudatory towards Chicago School
economics: and recognising this is perhaps particularly imperative now that Gary Becker is on record as having
acknowledged how positive the analysis was, including in the area where it is speciﬁcally laudatory, its recognition of the
innovative treatment of labour initially by Theodore Schultz and Becker, as the basis for Human Capital theory in the ﬁrst
place.14
Something, I think, has to be said about this, since it makes a crucial genealogical connection between this doubly
disciplinary form of the subject and the ‘disciplinary and ethical’ subject as articulated by Neu et al.; and it is then also the13 While the publication of The Birth of Biopolitics has led to extensive analysis of Foucault’s reading of the Chicago School, there is one particular piece by
Andrew Dilts which pursues the idea of this new homo oeconomicus as potentially ethical in a way similar to that suggested here: see Dilts (2011: esp 134-
139: see also his summary of earlier analyses, p. 131, n. 5). Dilts identiﬁes Foucault as seeing this modern subject form as a product of ‘a fundamental
shift. . .(in) the governing of rational actors’ (2011: 131). As Foucault puts it: ‘in (Gary) Becker’s deﬁnition. . .homo oeconomicus, that is to say, the personwho
accepts reality or who responds systematically to modiﬁcations in the environment, appears precisely as someone manageable. . ..someone who is
eminently governable’ (2008: 270). Hence for Dilts there is a profound ‘afﬁnity between aspects of Foucault’s late account of subjectivity and the neo-liberal
account of subjectivity’ (Dilts, 2011: 132).
14 Becker’s observations, which repeat several times how little he ﬁnds to disagree with in Foucault’s analysis, will be found in ‘Becker on Ewald on
Harcourt on Becker’ (Roundtable Discussion, 2012), pp. 10–15. I would like to thank Fredrik Weibull for drawing the transcription of this roundtable
discussion to my attention.
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School’s treatment of ‘labour’, its point of decisive conceptual break with all prior economic theory from the time of classical
economics on, is that it investigates labour speciﬁcally, rather than leaving it as an essentially passive and residual third
element in the classic trinity of factors making up the production of goods: sc. land, capital and labour.
Foucault, in a passage that introduces his whole analysis of the Chicago School, puts it this way. Previously ‘labour’ had
been left as ‘in a way, a blank sheet on which the economists have written nothing’ (Foucault, 2008: 219) because it was
reduced to ‘labour power’. This he suggests is ‘to neutralise (labour), and to do this by reducing it exclusively to the factor of
time’ (2008: 220).15
But with Schultz and Becker this changes. Finally the analysis of labour is conducted ‘in its concrete speciﬁcation and
qualitative modulations’ (221). The individual worker comes into view as a subject actively differentiable at the level of
individual performance and contribution (and in terms of past, present and future contribution too). Economics can set out
on a radically new plane of analysis (although as soon as Human Capital theory is framed in that way, it also becomes
possible to see how there aremany other possible forms of economic analysis starting from the differentiated subject, which
do not require the narrowness of horizon, let alone the convolutions involved, in positing the analysis of differentiated labour
exclusively in terms of capital and income).
However, leaving that aside, Human Capital theorywill always have the accolade of pioneer of this conceptual breakwith
the past of economics discourse, and Becker both sees this and recognises Foucault’s acuity in seeing it too. As he puts it:
‘What I like to say is: Human capital puts people at the centre of an economy. Traditional economics putmachinery, physical
capital, land and, somehow, some undistinguished labor (and Foucault mentions that) at the center. But Human capital says:
‘‘No. . . .(T)he really important form of capital is people. It’s people. And not simplywhat they are bornwith, butwhat they, or
the government, or the parents do to them—what we call ‘‘invest in them’’’ (Roundtable Discussion, 2012: 11, emphasis
added).
So a pioneering discursive break indeed: but aswith the birth of the prison, there is a discomﬁting conceptual question: in
this instance, why did it take economics so long? For the genesis of the calculable/calculating (or in my alternative
formulation, the accountable/self-accounting) self goes back to the 18th century. The genesis of such a self in workplace
settings can be shown to go back (for instance in work I have undertaken with Richard Macve) at least to 1831/2, at the US
Armory at Springﬁeld, MA. There Daniel Tyler, as US Army Inspector of Contract Arms, examines with watch in hand how
long it takes eachworker tomanufacture each component in a standard issuemusket, and then extrapolates from that a norm
of how long it should take excluding ‘slack’, and thus sets a target (differing for each component) of the number of acceptable
quality units to be produced per worker per day, plus a piece rate per unit which will produce a standard daily wage
(differentiated by ‘class of labour’ as deﬁned by level of skill) so long as the daily target of quality units is hit (Hoskin &Macve,
1994).
Hence it seems to me that, genealogically, the ‘entrepreneur of one’s self’ is the disciplinary and ethical subject’s twin—
Pollux to its Castor perhaps (with all the connotations of that twinly agonistic)—since both equally are historically speciﬁc
embodiments of double disciplinarity. But then how, if it has a shared connection to the connaissances and savoir of
knowledge disciplinarity, and to the rules and norms of conduct disciplinarity, can it be disqualiﬁed from constructing,
through its own particular relation to self/‘rapport a` soi’, its own ethicality?
I suggest that it cannot, as perhaps may become clear if we consider what the ethics of the ‘self-entrepreneur’ might be,
drawing upon Foucault’s four-fold classiﬁcation of the aspects of this relation. Here I draw on what he says concerning ‘a
historical ontology of ourselves in relation to ethics’ in the interview ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics’ (Foucault, 1987b: 351),
The four aspects he speciﬁes are: (i) ethical substance, i.e. what within me I make the object ‘concerned with moral
conduct’ (1987b: 352), (ii)mode of subjection/mode d’assujettissement, i.e. how am I as subject ‘invited or incited to recognise
(my) moral obligations’ (1987b: 353), (iii) self-practice/‘pratique de soi’ (1987b: 355), i.e. the ‘asceticism’ or repetitive
practice/askesis of regular self-construction) and (iv) the goal or end, i.e. ‘what I call the telos (te´le´ologie)’ (1987b: 355).
While there must be a dispersion of possible answers under each classiﬁcation, the regularities of human capital
discourse may suggest something like the following, drawing on Foucault’s suggestions concerning each category. So ﬁrstly
he suggests that ‘in our society. . .the part of our morality which is most relevant for morality is our feelings’ (1987b: 352),
which would perhaps translate here as ‘self-gratiﬁcation’, although Richard Macve has suggested to me that it may more
generally translate as some form of felicity or eudaimonia (in the form of a feliciﬁc calculus perhaps now that economists
have discovered ‘happiness’, for others at least). Second, the ways one may recognise one’s obligations may, he suggests, be
through following divine or natural law, or ‘a rational rule’ (1987b: 353), which one might have translated once as ‘rational
utility maximisation’ but now perhaps in these chastened times translates as ‘utility optimisation under conditions of
bounded rationality’: the self-practices of askesis are ‘the self-forming activity (pratique de soi)’ (1987b: 355) which may
include a whole array of regular disciplinary practices, such as exercising the body, following dietary and health regimes,15 Thus for Ricardo, labour power can be increased only by there being ‘an additional number ofworkers on themarket. . .of employingmore hours of labor
thus made available to capital’. For Keynes ‘labor. . .is a productive factor but which in itself is passive and only ﬁnds employment, activity and actuality
thanks to a certain rate of investment’ (2008:220). And Marx? Foucault observes that neoliberals ‘practically never argue with Marx’ but suggests that if
they did they would observe that while Marx ‘makes labor the linchpin, one of the essential linchpins of his analysis’, when he analyzes labour it is in terms
of labour power. ‘What is it that he shows the worker sells? Not his labor but his labor power’ (2008:221).
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with setting and tracking of personal targetswhere appropriate: ﬁnally the end or telos—the answer to the question ‘Which is
the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way?’ (1987b: 355)—will presumably be to optimise one’s
own level of human capital and its returns (through managing and monitoring both income streams and accretions to
capital), but also those of one’s assorted mate and the optimally managed number of offspring.
There is, I suggest, at least potentially, a consistent and self-reinforcing dynamic of ethicality here: (i) as ethical substance
felicity, perhaps as self-gratiﬁcation, pursued under (ii) a mode of subjection operating rational utility maximisation,
engaging in (iii) a regular askesis consisting of disciplinary knowledge and conduct practices, culminating in (iv) a system-
consistent telos of human capital optimisation. In short this subject operates in a technically virtuous circle, which can even
come with obligatory feedback and feedforward mechanisms to enable strategic reevaluation of the human capital life
project under conditions of uncertainty.
At the same time, if successful as a life project (at the level of Ivy League or Oxbridge or other equivalent elite university
graduation) it puts one directly in line for what Lewis (2014, September 24) has recently described as the ‘Occupational
Hazards of Working on Wall Street’ (but which apply equally to other equivalent elite ﬁnancial, political or corporate
‘powerhouses’): here the paradox painfully unfolds, where all that ethicality is likely to result, as Lewis observes, in the
evisceration of conventional ‘character’, as the interplay of object, subject, practices and telos of one’s ethicality leads the self-
entrepreneurial subject all too easily towards the kind of activities which will, if made visible in and to the non-powerhouse
world, be identiﬁed as ‘corrupt’.
Ironic outcome? Or predictable hazard of the way we live ethically now? This ﬁnal observation is not, in this instance,
made as part of a negative exercise. Neu et al’s ‘bottom-up’ engagement with the constitution of the subject is substantive
and important. My only point is to suggest that it may be timely to pose the question, ‘What about the box?’: and in doing so
to consider, for our historically speciﬁc era, what range of ‘subjects’ may fall under the aegis of being both doubly disciplinary
and conforming, however paradoxically, to a form of ethicality.
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